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Shifting Burdens in Criminal
Law: A Burden on Due Process
By VIVN DEBORAH WILSON*

Introduction
It is a mark of the adversary system that the accused, entering
the courtroom to undergo ordeal by trial, is perceived as cloaked in
the presumption of innocence for "all persons shall be assumed, in
the absence of evidence, to be freed from blame."1 Although more
accurately described as an assumption 2 of innocence, the term pre-

sumption clings, hovering over the prisoner as a "guardian angel,"
persisting through every phase of the drama, as the factual evidence unfolds, protecting the accused against conviction on the basis of bias, appearance or speculation. 4 The presumption of innocence does not derive from the probability that the accused is
innocent.5 It has nothing at all to do with probabilities, but functions to further social policy6-in this case, to counteract the suspicion raised by the filing of a formal accusation against the accused.7 So that "a man ... charged with a crime,... is not bound
* A.B., Hunter College; M.S., Columbia University; J.D., 1969, Hastings College of the
Law, University of California. Currently Associate Professor of Law, Hastings College of the
Law, University of California.
1. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 560 (1898).
See Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 444 U.S. 1, 2 (1979) (per curiam); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 523 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970); Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 460 (1895).
2. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal
Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969).
3. J. THAYER, supra note 1, at 553.
4. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 806 (E. Cleary
ed. 1972); J. THAYER, supra note 1, at 348; 9 J. WIGMORE, EVDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940).
5. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at § 2511.
6. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at § 336; J. THAYER, supra note 1, at 314.
7. "[I]n a criminal case the term [presumption] . . . convey[s] a special and perhaps
useful hint ... in that it cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion
that arises from the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced." 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4 at § 2511.
[731]
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to prove that he did not but his accuser is bound to prove that he
did commit it. The accused stands innocent until he is proven
guilty"8 ; until the prosecution has met the onerous burden of
proving, by the facts presented and beyond a reasonable doubt,"
the individual and personal guilt of the defendant of every element
of the crime charged. 10 The adversary system of criminal justice
does not permit conviction without proof of the traditional elements of crime: act, intent, causation and social harm.
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a corollary of the presumption of innocence, has been deemed indispensible by the Supreme Court of the United States for it "impresses
on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of
certitude" before condemning a man for the commission of a
crime.1 2 Although the reasonable doubt standard is less a precise
formula than it is a symbol," it satisfies certain imperatives. It offers society assurance that people innocent of crime shall not be
convicted; and, although it creates an inevitable margin of error,
"our society [has determined] that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."' 4 Second, the reasonable doubt standard protects the individual against the state's considerable resources and its potentially oppressive power to secure
the conviction of the essentially powerless defendant. 5 Perhaps
most important, the reasonable doubt standard has captured socie.ty's belief in the security of its own standards of criminal justice.
"[I]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned."' 6 It is also important in our
8. J. THAYER, supra note 1, at 558.
9. "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonabledoubt standard we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (emphasis
in original).
10. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1976); See also C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 4, at 681-82; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at § 2497.

11. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
12. Id. at 364 (quoting Dorsen & Reznick, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile
Law, FAm.L.Q., March 1970, at 1, 26 (1967)).
13. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice:Burdens of Persuasionin Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1307 (1977).
14. 397 U.S. at 372. See also Underwood, supra note 13, at 1306-07.
15. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
16. 397 U.S. at 364.
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free society that "every individual going about his ordinary affairs
have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of
a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his
'17
guilt with utmost certainty.
Of course, society bows to competing necessities and must be
wary that the zeal to prevent the conviction of the innocent not
result in the freeing of too many of the guilty.18 Where it is impossible for the prosecutor to overcome the presumption of innocence
with proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the law creates artifices to substitute for factual evidence. Presumptions shift the burden of proof to the defendant, relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving some element of the crime charged.19 Crimes are
redefined to transform an essential component of the offense into
an affirmative defense. 20 Definitions based on assumptions make it
possible to convict the accused of some offenses without evidence
either that he committed, or that he intended to commit the particular criminal act charged.2 1
Although the presumption of innocence and the concept of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's individual and
personal guilt can withstand considerable stress, there are limits.
Thus it is important to differentiate the devices that are permissible from those that may not be tolerated. For example, the problem of proving the mental state of the accused, the "vicious will"
as Blackstone phrased it, 22 has always presented the prosecution
with difficulties and, for that reason "[i]nferences and presumptions [became] a staple of our adversary system of fact-finding." 23
For centuries, trial judges instructed juries that an inference of
guilty knowledge or blameworthy intention could be drawn from
evidence of the performance of a criminal act.24 The common law
idea that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
17. Id. But see Judge Learned Hand's commentthat "[o]ur procedure has been always
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to
fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats
the prosecution of crime." United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
18. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977).
19. See Part I infra in which presumptions are defined.
20. See Part H infra in which affirmative defenses are defined.
21. See Part IV infra in which felony-murder and accomplice liability are defined.
22. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 21 (1769).
23. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979).
24. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973).
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consequences of his voluntary acts" 5 has been codified by many
jurisdictions" and seems no more than a reasonable conclusion.
Thayer wrote that
where a person was found standing over a wounded man with a
bloody sword in his hand, there is a presumption (or it may be
probably inferred) the one stabbed the other; the fact that the
man was found with a bloody sword has, in itself, apart from its
consequences, no weight; but it tends to 27determine the question
at issue, who stabbed the wounded man.
Thayer's illustration appears to be an inference rather than a
presumption; that is, it is a deduction which the jury may draw,
but is not required to draw, from the circumstantial evidence.
Since it is the jury's responsibility to determine from all the relevant evidence "who did what, where, when, how and with what
motive or intent,"2 8 such a deduction is not only proper, it is a
necessary aspect of the jury's fact-finding function.
But what of the effect of the more inflexible declaration,
"when a man voluntarily kills another, without more or stated, it is
presumed to be murder?" 2' 9 Can evidence of a killing, (the proved
fact) "without more known or stated," trigger the operation of a
presumption, thus supplying the malicious intention (the presumed fact)? Would not such an instruction interject a note of the
arbitrary into what we understand to be the truth-seeking function
of the adversary process of criminal justice?.
The trial judge in Sandstrom v. Montana0 instructed the jury
that "[tihe law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."3 1 The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed Sandstrom's conviction of murder, 2 holding that
the instruction violated his right to due process of law guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.3 3 The Court concluded that the instruction denied the fun25. Id.
26. CAL. Evm.

CODE § 668 (West
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (Vernon

1966); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (McKinney 1975);
1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 903.01 (West 1975).

27.

J. THAYER, supra note 1, at 547-48.

28.

K. DAvis,

29.

J. THAYER, supra note 1, at 327.

30.
31.
32.
33.

442 U.S. 510 (1979).
State v. Sandstrom, 176 Mont. 492, 496, 580 P.2d 106, 109 (1978).
442 U.S. at 527.
"No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

ADmINSTRATIVwE LAW TREATISE 296

(3d ed. 1962).

Summer 1981]

SHIFTING BURDENS IN CRIMINAL LAW

damental right of the defendant to the presumption of innocence
guilt of every
by relieving the state of the obligation of proving
34
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The holding of Sandstrom calls into question the methods employed to facilitate criminal convictions. It is the purpose of this
article to examine those methods. First, it will explore the use of
presumptions and affirmative defenses, and the consequent shifting of the burden of proof. A discussion will follow of the substantive law of conspiracy and felony-murder which, by definition, relieves the prosecutor of the burden of proving some components of
the criminal offense and imposes vicarious liability on accomplices
for acts committed by partners in crime. It is this author's position
that any device that allows conviction of a crime where traditional
requirements of proof have been relaxed is to be disapproved if
such a device effects incursions into what we have come to understand constitutes the defendant's right to due process-in this
case, the right to be free from conviction and the consequences of
punishment unless the imposition of criminal liability is grounded
on a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty of conduct properly identified as criminal.
I. Presumptions
In Sandstrom v. Montana,3 5 the Supreme Court rejected the
contention that the trial judge's instruction that "the law presumes
a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" 6
described a mere "permissive inference

' 37

permitting but not man-

dating the jury to infer intention from act.38 The Court also rejected the state's argument that the instruction did not shift the
burden of persuasion but placed, at most, the burden of producing
"some" contrary evidence on the defendant.39 Given the language
of the instruction, the Court reasoned, it offered the jury two posprocess of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

34. 442 U.S. at 524.
35. 442 U.S. 510 (1979), re&vg State v. Sandstrom, 176 Mont. 492, 580 P.2d 106 (1978).
36. Id. at 515.
37. In order to avoid the issue, the courts have interpreted statutory presumptions as
permissive inferences. See, e.g., County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140

(1979); see also Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1187 (1979).
38. 442 U.S. at 514-15.
39. Id. at 515-16.
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sible interpretations. It was either a conclusive presumption, a
mandatory "direction. . . to find intent" once the victim's death
was shown to be the result of Sandstrom's voluntary act, or it constituted a presumption that could be rebutted by the defendant's
proof that he did not possess the requisite intent.4 0 Had the jury
followed the literal language of the instruction, which had been
given without qualification, an essential element of the offense, the
defendant's intent, would have been withdrawn from the prosecution's case, and thus removed from the jury's consideration.
Relying on Morissette v. United States41 and United States v.
United States Gypsum Co. 42 which emphasize the necessity of
proving the element of intent in a criminal offense, the Court held
that "a conclusive presumption . . . would 'conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the
accused and which extends to every element of the crime.' . . .
[This] would 'invade [the] factfinding function' which in a criminal
case the law assigns solely to the jury [because] Sandstrom's jurors
could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find
against defendant on the element of intent. '43 The prosecution
would thus be relieved of the necessity of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged. The effect would
be identical to imposing what is recognized as strict liability on
Sandstrom, that is, liability for the murder without a showing of
culpability.
Nor would the instruction have been saved if the Sandstrom
jury had viewed the presumption as rebuttable, rather than conclusive. Proof by the state of the killing "without more known or
stated" would have shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant, requiring him to show by some quantum of proof, that he
lacked the mental state required for murder. Such a result defies
the constitutional mandate that "a State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and . . . may not
'44
shift the burden of proof to the defendant.
The Court's conclusion appears to be no more than an obvious
statement about the law as it is commonly understood. Where the
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 515.
342 U.S. 246 (1952).
438 U.S. 422 (1978).
442 U.S. at 523 (quoting in part, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
Id. at 524 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977)).
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crime charged is the traditional mala in se, the Court will not tolerate shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove the
essential element of mens rea or criminal intent. "The contention
that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human
will and a consequent ability and
duty of the normal individual to
45
choose between good and evil.
If Montana attempted to define the crime of felonious homicide by statute, as an act causing the death of a human being, thus
allowing the prosecution to make out a prima facie case without
proving intent or some equivalent, the statute would not provide a
sufficient basis for the determination of guilt to permit the imposition of punishment. It would also be impermissible to shift the
burden to the defendant to prove that he had not harbored the
requisite mens rea46-- for example that the act was not a first de45. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
46. For a general discussion of mens rea, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Prop. Official
Draft, 1962):
(1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in Section
2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material
element of the offense.
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof,
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause
such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of
the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disre-
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gree felony, committed purposely, a second degree felony, committed knowingly, a third degree felony, committed
recklessly, a
47
fourth degree felony, committed negligently.
A presumption isolates one fact from the totality of evidence
and allows the jury to draw a conclusion as to the existence of an
ultimate fact-a fact which constitutes an element of the crime
charged 4 8 -from the prosecutor's presentation of that basic fact.
As the Court indicated in Sandstrom, there are two kinds of presumptions-conclusive and rebuttable. 49 A conclusive presumption

is irrebuttable. It establishes an inflexible relationship between
fact A, the basic, evidentiary fact and fact B, the presumed fact in
issue. An irrebuttable presumption is "a categorical proposition, or
an express rule of law."'50 It "is not really a presumption at all, but
rather is a rule of substantive law."51
Although the criminal law is intolerant of conclusive presump-

tions and will not allow proof of fact A, the criminal act, to result
in a finding of fact B, the criminal intent, statutes imposing strict
liability52 achieve the same effect as a matter of substantive law.
These are regulatory statutes which require no showing of personal
gard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a lawabiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known
to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
47. But that, of course, does not end the inquiry. The subtleties of the element of
mens rea can be characterized in a fashion that permits shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant to show that his state of mind negated the essential mental element required for
the crime. The discussion of affirmative defenses will explore this possibility. See Part II
infra.
48. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), upheld a statute providing a presumption that the defendant operated a distillery (the ultimate fact) from evidence of his presence at the location (the basic evidentiary fact); see generally 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4,
at § 2491; J. THAYER, supra note 1, at 314.
49. 442 U.S. at 521.
50.
51.

J. THAYER, supra note 1, at 545.
G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 16, at 50 (1978).

52. Harsh though the result may appear "where unconsciousness of wrongdoing be
totally wanting" the Court has emphasized the justice of placing "the burden of acting at
hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in a responsible relation to a public
danger." United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
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guilt, and "depend on no mental element but consist only of forbidden acts or omissions.15 3 For example, strict liability is imposed

on sellers of dangerous drugs," perpetrators of air pollution,5 5 purfirearms,57 drunk
veyors of narcotics,56 possessors of unregistered
5 and seducers of underage females. 59
5
drivers
A rebuttable presumption, sometimes called a permissible inference in criminal cases, is stronger than an inference. An inference is simply a deduction of one fact from evidence of another
fact or group of facts.60 A rebuttable presumption is "a conditional
proposition . . . liable to be overcome by evidence on the other

side."61 It is created by legislation6 2 or by the court's instruction,
53. United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 253 (1952).
54. United States v. Dotterweich 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
250 (1922).
55. State v. Arizona Mines Supply Co., 107 Ariz. 199, 484 P.2d 619 (1971).
56. United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
57. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1970); N.Y. VEH. & TREA. LAW § 1194 (McKinney
1970); Tsx. TRAP. REG. CODE ANN. tit. 116, § 6701()-i (Vernon 1977).
59. Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1874), sets forth the traditional view
that even a reasonable mistake as to the age of the minor is no defense. See also State v.
Superior Court, 104 Ariz. 440, 454 P.2d 982 (1969); People v. Doyle, 16 Mich. App. 242, 167
N.W.2d 907 (1969). Chief Justice Traynor articulated the California rule that lack of scienter is a defense to a charge of statutory rape. People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529 (1964).
Furthermore, strict liability may also be imposed vicariously on someone who not only
lacks mens rea, but has not performed the actus reus-the employer of the bartender who
sells a drink to an already inebriated customer, Commonwealth v. Koczwara 397 Pa. 575,
155 A.2d 825 (1969); the general manager of a drug company which introduces misbranded
or adulterated drugs into interstate commerce, United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
In Park, the chief executive officer of Acme Markets was convicted of violating the Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act under an instruction that he "held a position of authority and
responsibility in the business ... [and] a responsible relation to the situation." Id. at 665. A
sentence of $50 fine on each count was imposed on Park. Although the statute required no
awareness of wrongdoing, the circumstances did show Park's knowledge of the misconduct
charged.
Where the penalties are severe and conviction imposes the stigma associated with crime
"[i]t would be unthinkable to impose vicarious criminal responsibility in cases involving true
crimes.... A man's liberty cannot rest on so frail a reed as whether his employee will
commit a mistake. . ." Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 585-86, 155 A.2d 825, 830.
60. CAL. Evw. CODE § 600(b) (West 1966).
61. J. THAYER, supra note 1, at 545.
62. Thus, statutes have provided that a person is guilty of operating a distillery if he is
present at the location. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); United States v.
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965). See also Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) (a
person possessing recently stolen mail knows it is stolen); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S.
398 (1970) (a person possessing cocaine and heroin knows these drugs to be imported);
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (a person possessing marijuana knows it to be
imported); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925) (a person possessing opium
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and may be founded on strong social policy 63 having nothing at all

to do with probabilities. On the other hand, it may reflect "what
history, common sense, and experience tell us about the relations
between events in our society.

6' 4

A presumption requires the party against whom it operates to
produce evidence to rebut it. It may have as many as eight different results. 5 Where there is no evidence contradicting either the
basic fact or the presumed fact, the party who has proved the basic
fact is entitled to an instruction that the presumed fact has been
proved. 6 In a civil case, that party would get a directed verdict. In
a criminal case, of course, a verdict may never be directed against
6
the accused.
According to the Thayer "bursting bubble" theory, a presumption imposes the burden of going forward with the evidence on the
party against whom it operates, and the presumption is destroyed
as soon as it is rebutted by contradictory evidence-that is, as soon
as evidence to support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact is introduced.' Once the presumption is overcome, the
existence of the presumed fact, the fact in issue, is "determined
exactly as if no presumption had ever been applicable.

69

The trier

of fact must then weigh the facts creating the presumption against
the contrary evidence.
Thayer's theory, approved by Wigmore7 ° and followed in the
Federal Rules of Evidence71 and the Model Code of Evidence," has
been widely criticized. Professor Morgan has argued that "[i]f
there is good reason for putting on one party or the other the burden of going forward with the evidence . . . it ought to be good
knows it has been imported unless the defendent explains it).
63. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 806-11; J. THAYER, supra note 1, at 314.
64. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 172 (1979).
65. Laughlin, In Support of The Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MIcH. L. REV.
195, 196-207 (1953).
66.

See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 832-33.

67. The basic Anglo-American policy of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all facts
necessary to establish a defendant's guilt precludes directing a verdict against an accused.
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947); United States v.
Manuszak, 234 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1956).
68. See generally J. THAYER, supra note 1, at ch. 8.
69. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 704(2) (1942).
70. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at § 2491.
71. FED. R. EVID. 303(b).
72. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 704(2) (1942).
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enough to control a finding when the mind of the trier is in equi-

librium.

'7 3

According to the Morgan theory,74 a presumption im-

poses not only the burden of going forward with the evidence, but

also the burden of persuasion (also called the burden of proof) on
the party against whom it operates. The presumption will continue
to operate until that party introduces evidence which persuades
the jury that the non-existence of the presumption is more likely
than not. In other words, if the party against whom the presumption operates introduces evidence of the non-existence of the presumed fact, the jury must be instructed that the presumption will
not be overcome until there is evidence that the non-existence
of
75
the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.
Because the use of presumptions in criminal cases presents an
obvious conflict with the reasonable doubt standard of proof required for criminal convictions, the Court has been faced with the
73.

E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF

LGATION 81 n.68 (1956).
74. See generally Morgan, FurtherObservations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REv.
245 (1943); Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 255 (1937).
75. CAL. Evw. CODE §§ 600, 601, 604, 607, 668 (West 1966) includes both the Thayer
and Morgan presumptions. The code classifies two kinds of presumptions. Those based on
social policy which may or may not have a basis in likelihood, have a Morgan effect in that
they operate to fix the burden of production. Those presumptions established "merely to
facilitate the determination of the particular action [which] are not expressions of policy but
expressions of experience," id. § 603 (Comment Law Revision Commission), function as
Thayer presumptions-to shift only the burden of production. For example, the presumption that a ceremonial marriage is valid, id. § 663; that official duty has been regularly performed, id. § 664; that a person not heard of in seven years is dead, id. § 667, affect the
burden of persuasion. The presumption that things which a person possesses are owned by
him, id. § 637; and that a letter correctly addressed and properly mailed has been received,
id. § 641, affect the burden of going forward with the evidence.
The Code provides that a presumption affecting the burden of proof in a criminal action will not establish any fact essential to the defendant's guilt unless it has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. The effect is that the defendant need raise only a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the presumed fact, id. § 607. A presumption that affects only
the burden of producing evidence does not require the defendant to assume the burden of
proof. The use of Thayer presumptions, requiring only the production of evidence by the
defendant, has been touted as a solution to constitutional problems inherent in using presumptions in a system where proof must be "beyond a reasonable doubt," see notes 76-78
and accompanying text infra. Professors Christie and Pye suggest that practical reforms
(broadened discovery by the defendant, adequate resources for investigation, improved communication with the prosecutor) address, more realistically, the problems of the criminal
defendant presented with the task of rebutting a statutory presumption, than solutions dependent upon "artificial suggestions ... to restrict the use of presumptions." Christie &
Pye, Presumptionsand Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DuKE L. J.
919, 942 (1970).
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necessity of determining the limits of their constitutional permissibility. Several tests have been used to sustain the use of presumptions in criminal cases, among them the "comparative convenience" test, which balances "convenience of proof and
opportunity for knowledge, ' 6 the "greater includes the lesser ' 7
78
theory and the "rational connection" test.
To sustain a presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion
in a criminal case, the Supreme Court requires a rational connection between fact A and B. As the Court stated in Tot v. United
States"9 :
[A] statutory presumption cannot be sustained ... if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of
lack of connection between the two in common experience ....
[W]here the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable
relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not
competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the
procedure of courts.80
The Court in Tot struck down, as irrational and arbitrary, a
provision of the Federal Firearms Act8 1 making possession of a
firearm or ammunition by an ex-convict or a fugitive from justice
"presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammunition was
shipped or transported or received. . . by such person in violation
'8 2
of this Act."
The Court in Tot did not explore the implications of the rational connection test for the reasonable doubt standard of proof.
Nor was the connection explicitly examined in Leary v. United
States,83 where the Court found it impermissible to presume from
the defendants' possession of marijuana a knowledge of its having
been imported.84 Having held that this presumption failed Tot's
more-likely-than-not test, the Court was not faced with the necessity of examining the test in light of the reasonable doubt
76. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 91 (1934). See generally C. McCoRMIcK, supra
note 4, at § 343.
77. Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
78. See, e.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
79. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
80. Id. at 467-68.
81. Act of June 30, 1938, ch. 850, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250 (repealed 1968).
82. Receipt of a firearm in interstate commerce, a requirement for federal jurisdiction,
became an element of the offense under the federal statute, id.
83. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
84. Id. at 52.
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standard. 5
In Turner v. United States," however, the Court, on the basis
of facts outside the record, announced that there was "no reasonable doubt that. . heroin is not produced in this country and that
therefore the heroin Turner had was smuggled heroin . . .,,a
Finding that the defendant "doubtless knew that the heroin he
had came from abroad," ' the Court reasoned that "'[c]ommon
sense'

. . .

tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably

become aware that the product they deal in is smuggled, unless
they practice a studied ignorance to which they are not entitled." 9
The connection between the presumption operating in that case
and the reasonable doubt standard, however, remained
unexplored.90
The Court finally acknowledged the ambiguous relationship
between standards of "reasonable doubt," "more-likely-than-not"
and "rational connection" in Barnes v. United States."' In that
case, the Court concluded that the common-law inference of guilty
knowledge from the unexplained9 2 possession of recently stolen
goods may under some circumstances satisfy due process standards.93 Specifically, the Court held that "if a statutory inference
submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies
the reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to
invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the
inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more85.
86.

Id. at 36 n.64.
396 U.S. 398 (1970).

87. Id. at 408.
88. Id. at 416.
89. Id. at 417 (citations omitted).
The presumptions in Leary and Turner (importation of marijuana, cocaine and heroin
from proof of their possession) provided the basis for federal jurisdiction. Professor Nesson
suggests that the matter of jurisdiction be treated as a legislative rather than an adjudicative fact, that is, one not requiring evidentiary support. Nesson, supra note 37, at 1218
n.109. See also 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE, § 15.03 (1958).
90. But see the powerful dissent by Justices Black and Douglas: "The fundamental
right of the defendant to be presumed innocent is swept away to precisely the extent judges
and juries rely upon the.

. .

presumptions of guilt found in [the statute]. .

.

. It would be a

senseless and stupid thing for the Constitution to take all these precautions to protect the
accused from governmental abuses if the Government could by some sleight-of-hand trick
with presumptions make nullities of those precautions." 396 U.S. at 430.
91. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
92. The requirement of explanation raises the question of who must do the explaining.
See Part II infra.
93. 412 U.S. at 843.

744

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 8:731

likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due pro' Although Justice Brennan protested that actual evidence
cess."94
of knowledge may have been insufficient to establish Barnes' guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, 5 the inference itself appeared to be no
more than a deduction drawn from the circumstantial evidence.
Sanctioning a similar leap of proof, the Court, in the earlier
case of United States v. Gainey98 upheld a federal statute"7 which
allowed proof of the defendant's presence at a distillery to support
the conclusion that he was carrying on its business. The trial court
delivered contradictory instructions, cautioning the jury that presence of an innocent man at a distillery did not of itself make him
guilty of operating the still, but also instructing that proof of the
defendant's presence "shall be deemed sufficient [evidence] to authorize conviction."98 The jury was thus empowered to ignore the
circumstantial evidence and reach the guilty verdict on the basis of
nothing more than evidence of presence. The Fifth Circuit in an
opinion by Judge Minor Wisdom, struck down the statute and conviction,9 9 and the United States Supreme Court reversed, 100 finding
the inference to be permissive rather than mandatory and finding a
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact
presumed:
Congress was undoubtedly aware that manufacturers of illegal iquor are notorious for the deftness with which they locate arcane
spots for plying their trade. Legislative recognition of the implications of seclusion only confirms what the folklore teaches-that
strangers to the illegal business rarely penetrate the curtain of
secrecy. 011
Although Gainey presented a convincing circumstantial case,
the Court failed to consider that the jury may have found Gainey
guilty on the basis of the presumption alone, thus casting doubt on
the conviction. 10 2 Further, in assuming that the rationality of the
94. Id.
95. Id. at 853-54. (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
96.

380 U.S. 63 (1965).

97. 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(1)-(2) (amended 1976).
98. 380 U.S. at 70.
99. Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963).
100. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
101. Id. at 67-68.
102. This consideration might have merited a reversal. Where the trial court's instruction makes it possible for the jury to find the defendant guilty by two routes, it cannot, of
course, be determined which route the jury pursued. Therefore, the conviction must be re-
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statute's presumption justified its operation, the Court was really
upholding the conviction on the ground that the defendant was,
more likely than not, guilty of the crime because he was present at
the scene. The Court's approval of the presumption thus transformed presence at a still, an essentially equivocal act, into a criminal offense.
Nor does it resolve the constitutional problem to provide, in
the words'of Gainey, that "the defendant by the evidence in the
case and by proven facts and circumstances [may explain] such
presence to the satisfaction of the jury."10 3 Such an instruction invites the jury to conclude that the defendant is guilty if he fails to
provide an explanation of his conduct. This would require the defendant to come forth with evidence in his defense, although the
prosecution had not sustained its burden of proving the conduct
that constitutes the offense. Shifting the burden to the defendant
in this fashion not only conflicts with the presumption of innocence but raises Fifth Amendment problems. 04 As Chief Judge
Breitel in People v. Patterson0 5 stated:
It would be an abuse of affirmative defenses, as it would be of
presumptions in the criminal law, if the purpose or effect were to
unhinge the procedural presumption of innocence.... Indeed, a
by-product of such abuse might well be also to undermine the
privilege against self-incrimination by in effect forcing a defendant in a criminal action to testify in his own behalf.10 6
The statute considered in Yee Hem v. United States0 7 explicitly imposed the burden of proof on the accused to rebut the presumption that the opium found in his possession was imported. 108
The Court dismissed the idea that the statute compelled the accused to bear witness against himself:
It leaves the accused entirely free to testify or not as he chooses.
If the accused happens to be the only repository of the facts necversed if one of those routes is constitutionally impermissible. This is the "two routes rule."
See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
103. 380 U.S. at 70.
104. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . ." U.S. CONsT.amend. V.
105. 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898 (1976).
106. Id. at 305, 347 N.E.2d at 909 (Breitel, C.J., concurring).
107. 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
108. Id. at 182. The presumption of importation from possession, made an element of
the offense, had as its purpose the provision of jurisdiction in federal court.
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essary to negative the presumption arising from his possession,
that is a misfortune . . inherent in the case. The same situation
might present itself if there were no statutory presumption and a
prima facie case.
were made by the evidence. The necessity of
an explanation by the accused would be quite as compelling in

that case as in this; but the constraint upon him to give testimony
would arise there, as it arises here, simply from the force of circumstances and not from any form of compulsion forbidden by

the Constitution.'"9
Of course, the prosecution's proof of the fact in issue-knowledge of importation-relied on the presumption that
proof of the evidentiary fact, possession alone, "shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction."'11 Further, the Court
did not require that the connection between the two be established

beyond a reasonable doubt but pronounced itself satisfied "that
the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be [a] purely arbitrary mandate." ' Thus it was
not the prosecution's proof of a prima facie case of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt that confronted the defendant with the necessity
of choosing between the strategic alternatives of either offering a
defense or relying on the privilege against self-incrimination. It

was, rather, "the creation of the presumption by the statute
that
11 2
compelled the accused to bear witness against himself."

The New York statute1 in County Court of Ulster County v.
109. Id. at 185.
110. Act of February 9, 1909, ch. 100, 35 Stat. 614, as amended by Act of January 17,
1914, ch. 9, 38 Stat. 275.
111. 268 U.S. at 183.
112. Professor Nesson argues that an instruction to the jury that the defendant may
explain his presence presents the jury with an inference of guilt based on the defendant's
silence thus solemnizing "the silence of the accused into evidence against him," in violation
of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965). Nesson, supra note 37, at 1211.
113. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1980):
The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omnibus,
of any firearm, defaced firearm, firearm silencer, bomb, bombshell, gravity knife,
switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stilleto, billy, black jack, metal knuckles, sandbag,
sandclub or slingshot is presumptive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile at the time such weapon, instrument or appliance is
found, except under the following circumstances:
(a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found upon the person of one
of the occupants therein;
(b) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found in an automobile which
is being operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, lawful and proper
pursuit of his trade, then such presumption shall not apply to the driver; or
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Allen,114 the most recent in a line of cases'1

5

examining presump-

tions, made presence in an automobile, with certain exceptions
"presumptive evidence" ' of the possession of certain delineated
weapons.1 17 The case involved three adult males and a sixteen
year-old girl who were jointly tried for possession of two large caliber handguns found near "Jane Doe's" handbag in the automobile
in which all four were riding. The trial court gave the usual instruction on the presumption of innocence, that it exists until
overcome by the jury's belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, in the
defendants' guilt. Then the judge directed the jury's attention to
the totality of evidence presented by the prosecution-the eyewitness testimony as well as "the reasonable presumption of illegal
possession."'

In examining the evidentiary device created by the statute, the
United States Supreme Court articulated the traditional test for
validity and emphasized that "the device must not undermine the
fact finder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by
the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt."11 9
The Court concluded that the New York statute created a permissible rather than a mandatory presumption1 20 and that the jury

had thus had the opportunity of rejecting it. It functioned, accord(c) if the weapon so found is a pistol or revolver and one of the occupants, not
present under duress, has in his possession a valid license to have and carry concealed the same.
In addition to the three exceptions delineated in § 265.15(3)(a)-(c) as well as the stolenvehicle and public-omnibus exception in § 265.15(3) itself, § 265.20 contains various exceptions that apply when weapons are present in an automobile pursuant to certain military,
law enforcement, recreational and commercial endeavors.
114. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
115. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United States, .396 U.S.
398 (1970); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S.
63 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
116. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1980).
117. See id. §§ 265.15(3)(a)-(c), 265.20.
118. 442 U.S. at 160-61 n.19. The trial court was affirmed in a memorandum decision
by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. People v. Lemmons, 49 A.D.2d 639,
370 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1975). On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, 40 N.Y.S.2d
505, 354 N.E.2d 836 (1976).
The defendants then sought a writ of habeas corpus which was granted by the United
States District Court for the Southern District. This was affirmed by the Second Circuit,
which found the New York statute "unconstitutional on its face." 568 F.2d 998, 1009 (2d
Cir. 1977).
119. 442 U.S. at 156.
120. Id. at 167.
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ing to the trial court's instructions, as an item of evidence susceptible to contradiction by other evidence, rather than as "the sole evidence of an element of the offense." '
Once again applying the "rational connection" test, the Court
found the presumption of possession to be entirely rational 122 given
the circumstantial evidence in the case. The occupants of the Allen
car were not hitchhikers; the handguns were within view of all and
not likely to be the sole property of any one.1 23 Finding that the
presumed fact was "more likely than not to flow" from the basic
fact, the Court stated, "[tihere is no more reason to require a permissive statutory presumption to meet a reasonable-doubt standard.

. .

than there is to require that degree of probative force for

other relevant evidence. 124
If the Court's view of the presumption as applied in Allen
were correct, there would be no more reason to require it to satisfy
a "more-likely-than-not" test than there is to require that degree
of probative force for other relevant evidence for "[it was] not the
sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt." 25 According to the
trial court's instructions, presence became simply one element to
be weighed as it would be weighed in the absence of a statute.
Thus it carried no more probative value than Jane Doe's handbag,
the length of the gun or the clarity of the window pane through
which the officer looked.
The trial court did not, however, leave it at that. The instruction on the statutory presumption making presence presumptive
evidence of unlawful possession informed the jury that "upon
proof of the presence of the .

.

. gun and the

. . .

weapons, you

may infer and draw conclusions that such prohibited weapon was
121. Id. at 166.
122. Id. Actually, the New York Court of Appeals, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 354 N.E.2d 836
(1976), in examining the history of the statute, acknowledged that possession could not be
established unless the weapon was within the reach and control of the accused and available
for use. Problems had arisen when revolvers were hidden in trunks, glove compartments,
under seats and all occupants were, therefore, acquitted of the crime of possession. Legislation making presence of a firearm presumptive evidence of possession by all occupants "required the occupants . . . to explain the presence of the firearm." The statute, in other
words, depended for its justification on the defendants' superior access to the information.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found this explanation insufficient to
uphold the statute. Allen v. County Court of Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977).
123. 442 U.S. at 163.
124. Id. at 167.
125. Id.
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possessed by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile. '126 Thus, the court isolated the presumption from the array of
circumstantial evidence and permitted a finding of guilt from proof
of mere presence. The Supreme Court, in upholding Allen's conviction, failed to acknowledge the possibility that it resulted solely
from the operation of the presumption. As a result, the error of
Gainey was repeated.
Moreover, the trial court's assurance that "[t]he presumption
*

.

. is effective only so long as there is no substantial evidence

contra indicating the conclusion flowing from the presumption,
and the presumption is said to disappear when such contradictory
evidence is adduced, ' 127 does not address the problem of burdenshifting. Ordinarily, in proving a case of illegal possession by every
one of the car's occupants, the prosecution would have to rule out
other explanations-that the gun had not been found on the person of one occupant, that the driver was not a licensed driver of a
car for hire, or that a single occupant had a valid license to carry a
pistol or revolver. 128 By providing for these defenses to overcome

the presumption, the statute appears to require the defendant to
bear the burden of proving facts that traditionally belong within
the prosecutor's prima facie case.
Some would argue that it is the prerogative of the legislature
to provide that presence in a car where a firearm is found constitutes a criminal act. Since the legislature is not required to provide
for any defenses, so the theory goes, the legislature can determine
1 29
the rules for the proof of any defenses gratuitously defined.

This reasoning, sometimes referred to as the "greater includes
the lesser" test, was first relied upon in Ferry v. Ramsey.130 The
statute s1 in issue in that case made bank directors personally liable for losses to depositors for deposits made while the bank was
insolvent, if the directors assented to the deposits with knowledge
of insolvency. Proof that the bank was insolvent when the deposits
were made created a presumption that the directors knew of the
126. Id. at 161 n.20 (quoting from the trial court transcript at 743).
127. Id.
128. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3)(a)-(c) (McKinney 1980).
129. A gratuitous defense is, by definition, one that the legislature is under no obligation to provide. Professor Underwood argues against singling out gratuitous defenses for
special treatment. Underwood, supra note 13, at 1323.
130. 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
131. REV. STAT. KAN., §§ 9-163-164 (1923) (repealed 1947); see 277 U.S. at 94.
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insolvency. Because the legislature could make directors liable to
depositors for every deposit accepted after the bank became insolvent, reasoned the Court, it could create the presumption of
knowledge from insolvency. 31 2 In affirming the judgment, Justice
Holmes held, "[t]he statute in short, imposed a liability that was
less than might have been imposed, and that being so, the thing to
be considered is the result reached, not the possibly inartificial or
clumsy way of reaching it." 131
Critics of the "greater includes the lesser" test argue that it is
not what the legislature can do but what it has done that is crucial.
Justice White, rejecting the inference of possession, custody and
control drawn from presence at a still in United States v. Romano,13 4 offered the reminder that "[tihe crime remains possession, not presence, and, with all due deference to the judgment of
Congress, the former may not constitutionally be inferred from the
latter." 35
One solution to the problem, as posed by Justice White, is
that offered by the Model Penal Code. The Model Penal Code requires the jury to find the presumed fact beyond a reasonable
doubt but permits the jury to "regard the facts giving rise to the
presumption as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact."'136 This
would allow a conviction of possession as long as the "crime" of
presence is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.""1
132. 277 U.S. at 94.
133. Id.
134. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
135. Id. at 144. As shall be shown in Part II infra, however, the "greater includes the
lesser" test may have acquired new vitality in the holding of Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977), which sustained the practice of shifting the burden to the defendant to
prove an affirmative defense.
136. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(5)(b) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
137. California has opted for a similar solution. The California solution requiring the
facts giving rise to the presumption be established beyond a reasonable doubt, means that
the defendant "need only raise reasonable doubt as to the existence of the presumed fact."
CAL. EvID. CODE § 607 (West 1966). The presumption created by the provision of the Dangerous Weapons Control Law making possession of a firearm whose marks of identification
have been tampered with prima facie evidence that tampering was done by the possessor
merely requires the possessor "to go forward with evidence to the extent of raising a reasonable doubt that he tampered with the identification marks." People v. Scott, 24 Cal. 2d 774,
783, 151 P.2d 517, 521 (1944). Unless the judge instructs that the statutory presumption has
no more effect than any ordinary inference that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, the presumption would appear to place additional weight on the fact of the defendant's possession.
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Since statutes continue to provide that presumptions of criminal activity may be drawn from evidence of innocent activity, it is
the responsibility of the trial court to insure that the presumption
does not relieve the prosecutor of the necessity of proving all elements of the crime. It should be made clear to the trier of fact that
the defendant's guilt of criminal activity cannot be predicated on
anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the conduct
defined as criminal. Therefore, proof, by whatever standard, of activity itself innocent-that is, proof of the basic evidentiary
fact-can have no more probative force than proof of any other
item of circumstantial evidence. The jury must be instructed that a
statutory presumption is to be regarded as a mere inference and
not as additional independent proof of guilt. Furthermore, an instruction to the jury that the presumption's existence is vulnerable
to contrary evidence should make it clear that it is not the defendant's obligation to offer explanations, either by his own testimony
or by the production of other evidence. The jury may not be permitted to indulge in an inference of the defendant's guilt from his
failure to offer proof of his innocence, but must be cautioned that
it is the prosecutor's obligation to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt before there may be a conviction of the crime charged.
II.

Affirmative Defenses

Affirmative defenses, which impose the burden of persuasion
on the defendant, are sometimes defined by that fact, that is, an
affirmative defense is that circumstance or set of circumstances in
a criminal case, which places the burden of persuasion on the defendant. Such a definition is, however, no more illuminating than
the statement that a fact is an essential element of the crime
charged if the burden of proving it is allocated to the prosecutor. It
is the result of an affirmative defense, and not its essence, that the
burden of proof is imposed on the defendant."" 8 It does not appear
to be less problematical, however, to characterize an affirmative defense as a fact or set of facts sufficiently detached from the definition of the crime that it does not constitute a central essential element. Elements of crimes and facts constituting defenses are
intimately implicated with each other, occupying, as they do, the
same arena. A fact defined as an essential element of a crime in
138. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at § 346.
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one jurisdiction can become an affirmative defense in another.
Since the function of an affirmative defense is identical to the effect of a rebuttable presumption, in any case raising the question
of whether or not the prosecution has been relieved of the burden
of satisfying the reasonable doubt standard, the outcome may depend on the language employed. 13 9 That is precisely the lesson offered by a comparison of Mullaney v. Wilbur 1° with Pattersonv.
New York."'
In the murder trial of Stillman Wilbur,4 2 the trial court, following Maine's practice, instructed the jury that "'malice aforethought is an essential and indispensible element of the crime of
murder,' . . . without which the homicide would be manslaughter.' 43 The court emphasized that "malice aforethought and heat
144
of passion on sudden provocation are two inconsistent things"

and further instructed that once the prosecution established an intentional and unlawful homicide, "malice was to be conclusively
implied""45 and the burden of proof would shift to the defendant
to prove, by a "fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in
the heat of passion on sudden provocation.'

4

In reversing Wil-

bur's conviction for murder, the United States Supreme Court held
unanimously that the instruction violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment"4 7 because it relieved the prosecution
of the burden of proving every element of the crime charged. Since
malice was an essential element of the crime charged, and since it
could not exist in a state of mind characterized by heat of passion
on sudden provocation, the prosecution's burden included proving,
"beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of heat of passion on sud48
'
den provocation. "

Wilbur depended for its holding on a reading of In re Win139. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975).
140. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
141. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
142. 421 U.S. at 685.
143. Id. at 686.
144. Id. (citation omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
148. 421 U.S. at 704.
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ship149 that required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt not only all the facts necessary to define the crime charged
but also the non-existence of every fact constituting an excuse or
justification-that is, every detail necessary for the imposition of
criminal liability. 150 Quoting Winship, the Court emphasized the
defendant's critical interests requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-"the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
' 15 1
conviction and. . . the certainty that he would be stigmatized."
Wilbur appeared to have dire implications for the survival of
affirmative defenses. If, for example, a murderous intention cannot

coexist in the mind of the accused along with the belief that he is
in danger of immediate death or great bodily injury from an enemy, real or hallucinatory, then the prosecutor should logically be
required to prove the absence of the affirmative defenses of selfdefense,152 duress,158 necessity1 54 and insanity,15 5 on the ground
149.

397 U.S. 358 (1970).

150. Professors Jeffries and Stephan characterize this as the procedural interpretation
of Winship which they consider "potentially pernicious in effect." Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1353
(1979).
151. 421 U.S. at 700 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363).
152. One who is unlawfully attacked by another and who has no opportunity to resort
to the law for his defense, may take reasonable steps to defend himself from physical harm.
The principle of justification will provide a complete defense. The burden of proof is generally upon the defendant to prove self-defense to a charge of criminal homicide. See Quillen
v. State, 49 Del. 114, 110 A.2d 445 (1955); Richie v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 1000 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1951); De Vaughn v. State, 232 Md. 447, 194 A.2d 109 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
927 (1964). See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScOTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 391-97
(1972).
153. One who, under the pressure of an unlawful threat from another human being to
harm him (or to harm a third person) commits what would otherwise be a crime, may under
some circumstances be excused. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 152, at
374. For statutes imposing the burden of proving the defense of duress, see, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 464 (1975); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 8.05 (Vernon 1974). See also
United States v. Stevison, 471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950 (1973);
Roy v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1973); People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 282
N.E.2d 322, 331 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1972); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2512.
154. One who, under pressure from natural forces, commits what would otherwise be a
crime may raise the defense of necessity as justification. See generally W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTr, supra note 152, at 381. The Model Penal Code states that, "(1) conduct which the
actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable,
provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02
(Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
155. One half of the states and the federal government impose the burden of proving
the defendant's insanity on the prosecution. Those placing the burden on the defendant by
a preponderance of evidence standard justify it on the ground that it is an affirmative de-

754

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 8:731

that the defendant cannot harbor inconsistent intents.
It was predictable that, following Wilbur, some courts would
strike down schemes shifting the burden of affirmative defenses. 156
However, some courts restricted Wilbur's holding to its facts, and
others continued to distinguish between defenses that could be assigned to the prosecutor and those that required proof by the defendant.15 7 Seven years after Wilbur, Patterson v. New York l s" either restored Winship to its appropriate role in the scheme of
things, or in the words of Justice Powell, writing for the dissent,
"drain[s] In re Winship... of much of its vitality."159 Patterson
involved one of twenty-five affirmative defenses explicitly created
by the New York legislature-the defense of extreme emotional
disturbance.16 0 The trial court instructed that once the prosecution
fense and there is a presumption of sanity. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), upheld an
Oregon statute, since repealed, that placed the burden of proving insanity on the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt. The problems posed by the insanity defense are too complex for
anyone to imagine that the solution lies in determining who shall bear the burden of proof.
156. See, e.g., State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 28, 359 A.2d 715 (1976) (extreme
emotional disturbance as mitigation to murder); Fuentes v. State, 349 A.2d 1 (Del. 1975)
(extreme emotional disturbance as mitigation to murder); State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632,
220 S.E.2d 575 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 233 (1977) (self defense). Other
courts have imposed a burden of proof on the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1979) (discriminatory enforcement of the law); Cade v. State,
375 So.2d 802 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd, 375 So.2d 828 (Ala. 1979) (insanity); State v. Grady,
276 Md. 178, 345 A.2d 436 (1975) (alibi).
157. See, e.g., Hallowell v. Keve, 555 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1977); Zemina v. Solem, 438 F.
Supp. 455, 467 n.13 (D.S.D. 1977); Grace v. Hopper, 425 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ga. 1977),
rev'd, 566 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1978); People v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 953, 544 P.2d 1335, 127
Cal. Rptr. 135 (1976).
158. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
159. Id. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting).
160. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975) provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed
them to be.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2) (McKinney 1975) provides:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute
murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as
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proved "beyond a reasonable doubt that [Patterson] intended, in
firing the gun, to kill either the victim himself or some other
human being," the defendant had the burden of proving his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.161 If the defendant sustained that burden, the jury could then find him guilty of
manslaughter instead of murder.
Since the defense of severe emotional disturbance is
equivalent to the common-law defense of heat of passion on sudden provocation, 162 which requires proof, in many jurisdictions, by
the defendant, the Court could simply have held that "[p]roof of
the non-existence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a
rule in this case and apply it to the statutory defense at issue
here."16 3 But Wilbur required distinguishing. The Court did so on
the ground that the New York statute did not define murder as
homicide committed with malice aforethought and therefore the
prosecution was not required to prove the absence of provocation.
Patterson's defense of severe emotional disturbance was not, thus,
an element in the case but "constitut[ed] a separate issue on which
the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion."' "
The Court acknowledged that the due process clause "requires the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
included in the definition of the offense. '" 5 It then noted the apparent distinction between Patterson and Wilbur, "nothing was
presumed or implied against Patterson.1'" 6
defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision.
161. 432 U.S. at 199-200.
162. Provocation sufficient to induce, in the reasonable person, a temporary loss of
normal self control can negate the necessary intent for murder and reduce the conviction to
manslaughter. See note 160 supra.
The New York defense is adapted from the MODEL PENAL CODE § 210(1)(b) (Prop. Official Draft 1962) which does not place the burden of proof on the defendant.
163. 432 U.S. at 210.
164. Id. at 207.
165. Id. at 210.
166. Id. at 216. Professor Allen implies that the Court should have been sufficiently
forthright to override Wilbur. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on,
Burdens of Persuasionin CriminalCases After Pattersonv. New York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30
(1977).
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Whether or not the conclusion in Pattersonis desirable, 6 7 the
Court's reasoning is too insubstantial to support it. Justice Powell,
writing for the dissent, perceived that the Court's acceptance of
the artificial differences between elements, presumptions and affirmative defenses cleared the way for the legislature to shift the
burden of proving any fact in a criminal case from the prosecution
to the defendant, as long as the statute did not include non-existence of that fact in the definition of the crime. 8 Justice Powell
was not reassured that the Court's approval of New York's statutory scheme would not result in alarming attempts to shift
prosecutorial burdens despite the majority's assertion that "there
are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may
not go."' 16 9 Implicitly acknowledging the "greater includes the
lesser" rule, Justice Powell warned that the majority opinion would
allow a statute to define the crime of murder "as mere physical
contact between the defendant and the victim leading to the victim's death, but then set up an affirmative defense leaving it to17the
0
defendant to prove that he acted without culpable mens rea.'
Chief Judge Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals, quoted
with approval in the majority opinion in Patterson,'7 1 saw the
threat somewhat differently. "In the absence of affirmative defenses the impulse to legislators, especially in periods of concern
about the rise of crime, would be to define particular crimes in unqualifiedly general terms, and leave only to sentence the adjustment between offenses of lesser and greater degree."172 In other
words, if it became constitutionally impermissible to shift the burden of proof on defenses to the defendant, New York could retail167. Professor Fletcher correctly viewing Patterson as overruling Wilbur, cautions
that "it does not follow that every principle of justice must be grounded in the due process
clause," and interprets Patterson as a "decision based on principles of federalism and respect for the independent evolution of state systems of criminal law." G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 551 (1978).
168. 432 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 210.
170. Id. at 224 n.8; Professor Underwood also predicts catastrophe. Underwood, supra
note 13, at 1326.
171. 432 U.S. at 211 n.13.
172. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 306, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909 (1976) (Breitel, C.J.,
concurring). Actually, the possibility is not at all farfetched. Lady Wooten has argued that
the requirement of mens rea be eliminated from the definition of crimes. The criminal proceeding would aim at determining whether the defendant had committed the act prohibited.
Only then would mental state be considered to determine the appropriate disposition. B.
WOOTEN, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 32-57 (1963).
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ate by eliminating defenses-i.e., permitting the defendant's conviction, under a statute defining felonious homicide as the intent to
kill and the killing, and leaving it to the judge, at the sentencing
proceeding, to hear testimony as to emotional disturbance.
Commentators have perceived what appear to them to be
graver dangers-that prohibitions on burden-shifting would impede law reform by discouraging legislators from providing for affirmative defenses. But such prohibitions would not assure fair
treatment for the accused because the procedural approach does
not address the substantive basis for assigning guilt. 173 The argument is attractive to any writer who can recall Professor Hart's
query: "What sense does it make to insist upon procedural safeguards in criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can be made
'17 4
a crime in the first place?
It is true, of course, that solutions emphasizing procedural formalities cannot correct deficiencies in substantive justice. But procedure is no more separable from substance than elements are
from facts of excuse or justification, than presumptions are from
affirmative defenses. Nor does it appear useful to separate the two.
Professors Jeffries and Stephan, following Professor Allen's
lead, attempt to detach substance from procedure. Surely no one
would contradict the thesis that proportionate punishment may be
imposed only after conviction, on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, of a criminal act committed with culpable mens
rea. But arguing for a constitutional requirement of "proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of a constitutionally adequate basis for imposing the punishment authorized, 1 7 5 does not solve the problem it
purports to address.
Let us consider the crimes of murder and manslaughter. If
murder and manslaughter are defined separately by statute, the
former as the intent to kill a human being and causing the death of
that person or a third person and the latter as an intentional killing under extreme emotional distress or in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation, the prosecution's burden is straightforward.
For murder, he must show intent, act, cause and result. For manslaughter, he must show emotional disturbance or heat of passion.
173.
174.
175.

See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 150, at 1358.
Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 431 (1958).
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 150, at 1327.
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Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will result in conviction
and the appropriate penalty.
In the usual case, however, that is not what happens. The
prosecutor will charge murder and the defense will go forward with
evidence of heat of passion or extreme emotional disturbance as a
defense. The problem is identical to the one presented by a statute
that defines murder and manslaughter as different degrees of
homicide and provides for reducing murder to manslaughter upon
proof of the appropriate defense. Jeffries and Stephan propose this
solution:
If the definition of the crime of murder is intent to kill and
causing the killing and if that intentional conduct, whether or not
provoked, justifies the maximum sentence that can be imposed,.
then the state has fulfilled its constitutional obligation. By providing for an affirmative defense that will mitigate punishment and
requiring the defendant to bear the burden of its proof, the state
has not infringed on the defendant's right to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt but has, in fact, afforded the defendant
more than the constitutional minimum. 17 6 If proof of intentional or
reckless homicide, whether or not provoked, were thought to be
adequate to support a life sentence, "nothing would bar the state
from going beyond the constitutional minimum to allow mitigation
1 77
when the defendant can prove his claim to it.

The problem with this solution is that it does not work. As
Jeffries and Stephan recognize it is a constitutional requirement
that punishment be proportionate to the crime committed.17 8 Punishments that are excessive, whether because of method or severity, are offensive to the Eighth Amendment proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment and will not be tolerated. 17 9 Since
176. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 150, at 1370-83. It is not, of course, a novel solution that Jeffries and Stephan offer. See Allen, supra note 166, at 39-41; Christie & Pye,
supra note 75, at 931-32. "It would be useless to insist on precise criteria for conviction,
formulated in advance of the event, if those criteria could be satisfied by low standards of
proof." Underwood, supra note 13, at 1348.
177. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 150, at 1382-83.
178. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 150, at 1380-83.
179. The Court applied the doctrine of proportionality in Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910), holding that fifteen years hard labor was disproportionate to the crime of
falsification of a public document and therefore cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment and, more recently in the death penalty cases. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). "Under Gregg, punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals
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that is the case, it ought to be obvious that the same sentence may
not be imposed for murder and manslaughter. Because "[t]he law
regards with some tolerance an unlawful act impelled by a justifiably passionate heart [and] has no toleration whatever for an unlawful act impelled by a malicious heart,"180 punishment justified
for the crime of murder will be too severe for the crime of manslaughter, and punishment justified for manslaughter will be too
lenient for murder. Hence, the constitutional problem raised by
imposing the burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant are not solved by the Jeffries-Stephan approach. The question remains: To whom shall the burden of proving which crime
occurred be assigned? Shall the defendant be required to prove
that the crime was manslaughter? Or shall the prosecutor be required to prove that it was not?
Whether included in the definition of crime, or defined separately, all affirmative defenses raise the same problem. If for example, the defendant has committed a homicide in self-defense, he is
not guilty of any crime. 81 Similarly, if he has killed under duress,
he may not be entitled to an acquittal but the jury must be instructed on the legal effect of duress.'8 2 Further, if he was intoxicated 1 3 at the time of the killing, or under the influence of
drugs,8 he may have been incapable of harboring the mental attiof punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). One of the first California cases to analyze the question of
excessive punishment was In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217(1972), in which the California Supreme Court outlined three tests for determining whether
the punishment imposed was disproportionate to the crime committed: the nature of the
offense and the offender, a comparison of the punishments imposed in the same jurisdiction
for other offenses, a comparison of the punishment imposed in other jurisdictions for the
same offense. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 150, at 1396-97; Allen, supra note 166, at
46.
180. Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 155, 200 A. 632, 637 (1938).
181.

See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1970).

182. See note 187 infra.
183. Involuntary intoxication resulting in unconsciousness will be a complete defense.
People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970). Voluntary intoxication may
negate specific intent where that is an element of the crime charged, thus reducing assault
with a deadly weapon to simple assault and burglary to trespassing. People v. Hood, 1 Cal.
3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969). Voluntary intoxication may also result in
diminished capacity thus negating the defendant's ability to willfully deliberate a killing or
to harbor malice aforethought. People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr.
815 (1966).
184. Drug use has consequences similar to alcohol. Excessive use may result in such a
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tude required for the crime of murder. Shall the defendant be required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is not
guilty of the crime charged, that he has committed a lesser offense,
or that some alternative to the penal sanction provided for the
crime is appropriate? Or shall the prosecutor bear the burden, in
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, of proving the non-existence of the defense?
The solutions of the various jurisdictions are not consistent
and so it would be unproductive to attempt to make the determination on the basis of whether or not the defense is gratuitous, 85
complete,186 a matter of justification or excuse, 87 or whether the
facts constituting the defense are more accessible to the defendant.18 8 Nor can the argument that the reasonable doubt burden is
too onerous for the prosecutor, or that it increases the risk of acquitting the guilty, be allowed to overcome the defendant's right to
be proved guilty of the conduct that constitutes the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The defense of alibi is a good example. If a defendant charged
with murder defends on the ground that he is not the person who
committed the crime, and an alibi witness can prove his presence
elsewhere, he would be required to produce evidence to raise the
issue. But he would not be required to assume the burden of proving his defense. Unless the prosecutor eliminated beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's claim of alibi, he would not have
proved the defendant guilty of the offense. And the proof would
not justify imposing the penalty authorized for the crime of
murder. 189
lack of capacity that the rules governing the insanity defense would apply. See People v.
Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954).
185. A gratuitous defense is one which the legislature can eliminate. Underwood,
supra note 13, at 1325.
186. A complete defense results in an acquittal; a partial defense results in a finding of
a lesser included offense.
187. The claim that a crime is justified means no crime has been committed, e.g., selfdefense, law enforcement. The claim of excuse is a claim of mitigation: circumstances excuse
the commission of the crime, e.g., duress.
188. See note 210 and accompanying text infra.
189. Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968) held
that the Ohio instruction on alibi, requiring the defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance offended due process because "[p]roof of the defendant's presence . . . is a wholly
indispensable factor to the government's case... a sine qua non to sustain a verdict of
guilty" and therefore required proof by the prosecution including proof of the absence of
alibi. Id. at 119-20.
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The same rationale applies to any defense that negates some
component of the crime charged. If the defendant is required to
assume the burden of its proof, by whatever standard, he may be
convicted of the crime charged even where a reasonable doubt remains as to guilt.
Two excellent examples of the hardship this may work on defendants are the crimes of conspiracy and felony-murder. Proof of
these crimes consists in part of the operation of presumptions
which relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving that the
defendant intended to commit the crime charged.
The two crimes will be examined separately.
III. Conspiracy
In Morissette v. United States,19 0 the Supreme Court warned
against radical change in "the weights and balances in the scales of
justice."1'9 1 It warned against stripping the defendant of commonlaw benefits in order to "ease the prosecutor's path to conviction." 92 This warning goes unheeded at a time when the legislatures, confronted with increased crime rates, further the admitted
objective of easing the prosecutor's burden.
In 1975, the Supreme Court of West Virginia in Pinkerton v.
Farr1' 3 found a statute enacted in 1882194 to be unconstitutional.
The West Virginia statute, known as the Red Men's Act, had been
enacted because "lawless bands of men, known as . . . 'Vigilante
Committees' . . . were in the habit of inflicting punishment and
bodily injury upon peaceful citizens. . and destroying their property.119 5 The statute provided that "[i]f. . . it be proved that two
or more persons. . . were present, aiding and abetting in. . . [inflicting any punishment or bodily injury upon another person] it
shall be presumed that such offense was committed in pursuance
of such combination or conspiracy, in the absence of satisfactory
proof to the contrary."1 The statute thus provided for a presump190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

342 U.S. 246 (1952).
Id. at 263.
Id.
220 S.E.2d 682 (1975).
W. VA. CODE § 61-6-7 (1977).
State v. Porter, 25 W. Va. 685 (1885).
W. VA. CODE § 61-6-7 (1977).
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tion of conspiracy on proof of the commission of assault. The court
in Pinkerton found that the statute obliterated the presumption of
innocence and relieved the prosecutor of the burden of proving the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court interpreted
the statute's phrase "in the absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary"19 7 as imposing the burden on the defendant of proving
his innocence and concluded that the provision violated the constitutionally protected mandate against self-incrimination of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution19 8 and article
3, section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution.9 9
The statute in Pinkerton v. Farr2 e° was no more than a legislative articulation of what is everywhere regarded as traditional conspiracy law. The substantive law of conspiracy defines conspiracy
as an agreement between two or more 201 to commit an unlawful
act. Although agreement is, in everyone's understanding, the "essenceM02 or "gist"2 03 of conspiracy, a tacit understanding will suffice without proof of either written or spoken words.'" This is because conspiracies are clandestine and the prosecutor "is without
the aid of direct testimony . . . [and must] rely on inferences
drawn from the course of -conduct of the alleged conspirators."2 0 5
Justice Coleridge, in Regina v. Murphy,20 6 articulated an early
statement of the rule which persists in only slightly modified form
today:
If you find that these two persons pursued by their acts the same
object, often by the same means, one peforming one part of an
act, and the other another part of the same act, so as to complete
it, with a view to the attainment of the object which they were
pursuing, you will be at liberty to draw the conclusion that they
197.

220 S.E.2d at 687.

198.

"No person ...

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
199. "[N]or shall any person, in any criminal case, be compelled to be a witness
against himself. .. ." W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 5.

200. 220 S.E.2d 682 (1975).
201. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 123 (1842); King v.
Jones, 110 Eng. Rep. 485 (K.B. 1832).
202. See, e.g., Black v. United States, 252 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1958).
203.

See, e.g., People v. Gem Hang, 131 Cal. App. 2d 69, 72, 280 P.2d 28, 29 (1955).

204. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
205. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939).
206. 173 Eng. Rep. 502 (Q.B. 1837).
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have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.0 7
Under this rule, it would appear reasonable for a jury to conclude that an agreement exists where there is evidence of related
activities by co-conspirators directed toward an illegal objective.
But an instruction that is no more specific encourages arbitrary
action because it fails to impose a standard by which the jury may
make its findings. The jury is, rather, "at liberty to draw the conclusion" 20 8 without any reference to the quantity of proof that
must be adduced before evidence of the activity of co-conspirators
can, without more, result in a determination that a conspiracy exists. Will a scintilla of evidence suffice? Clear and convincing evidence? Rational connection between act and agreement? One thing
is certain: traditional conspiracy law carries no assurance, indeed
no hint, that the reasonable doubt standard must be satisfied. In
fact, there appears to be little recognition, even by modern writers,2 0° that conspiracy law has implications for the constitutional
mandate that requires the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The justification for directing the jury to conclude
that a conspiratorial agreement exists, because certain acts occurred, stems from the Court's anxiety that facets of the prosecutor's case will "remain undiscovered and undiscoverable. Secrecy
and concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy.
The more completely they are achieved, the more successful the
,210
crime.
The Court has noted that, if the prosecutor were required to
observe constitutional standards for the determination of criminal
guilt of conspiracy, the difficulties "of certainty in proof. . would
become insuperable, and conspirators would go free by their very
ingenuity."2 11
207. Id. at 508.
208. Id.
209.

See, e.g.,
Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy,61 Csnv. L. RPv. 1137

(1973).
210.

Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 556 (1947). This is an implicit exten-

sion of the comparative convenience test for the sustaining of presumptions. See Part I
supra. Where evidence is peculiarly accessible to the defendant, not only may the defendant
be required to assume the burden of proof, but proof of that evidence may be eliminated

from the case entirely.
211.

332 U.S. 557. This is reminiscent of the Court's fear in Patterson v. New York,

432 U.S. 197 (1977), that requiring the state to prove the existence of affirmative defenses
would be "too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate." Id. at 209. "[T]oo many

persons deserving treatment as murderers would escape that punishment." Id. at 207. Con-
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The prosecutor's evidence of an act or acts innocent in themselves, but sufficient to support the conclusion that there has been
an agreement, constitutes a prima facie case of conspiracy and triggers the operation of further inferences. "Slight evidence" will suffice to implicate others as co-conspirators. A crime that is reasonably foreseeable and performed in furtherance of the agreement, if
committed by any participant, is attributed to all conspirators.212
Even if a defendant had no knowledge of the crime, played no part
in its commission 213 and did not know "the identity, or even the
number, of his confederates," 14 conspiracy theory would make him
an accomplice in the crime. For -example, in Pinkerton v. United
States,21 Daniel Pinkerton, who had been incarcerated during the
perpetration of the crimes in question, was found guilty of offenses
committed by his brother, Walter, without any evidence of
Daniel's direct participation, simply because Daniel and Walter
had previously conspired to commit similar crimes.11 In Anderson
v. Superior Court,217 Anderson was held responsible for twenty-six

illegal abortions performed by Dr. Stern on evidence that she had
referred several pregnant women to the doctor and had received
payment for her services. She had, thus presumably acquired a
"stake in the venture."218
Pinkerton and Anderson were held strictly accountable for
crimes committed by someone else, that is, they were judged guilty
as accomplices without the evidence that would otherwise have
cern that conspirators be convicted has led to other problems in conspiracy law. Conspiracy
permits joint trials in the jurisdiction in which any act occurred, thus raising Sixth Amendment problems. It provides for enhanced punishment and permits conviction for a felony
where the offense committed is a misdemeanor or "any act injurious to the public health or
to public morals." See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 182.5 (West Supp. 1981). Further, it has
added to the proliferation of hearsay exceptions with the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule which permits hearsay declarations to be attributed to all co-conspirators.
212. Professor Johnson attributes the problem to the courts' fallacy in viewing conspiracy as an "ongoing business relationship of indefinite scope and duration." Johnson,
supra note, 209, at 1147.
213. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
214. United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1944).
215. 328 U.S. 640.
216. Pinkerton has been disapproved by the commentators. See W. LAFAvE & A.
Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 514 (1972). See also MODE.L PENAL CODE § 2.04, Comment (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1953).
217. 78 Cal. App. 2d 22, 177 P.2d 315 (1947); see also Stern v. Superior Court, 78 Cal.
App. 2d 9, 177 P.2d 308 (1947).
218. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943); see also United States
v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
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been necessary for the imposition of accomplice liability, that is,
intentionally assisting or encouraging the perpetrator "with the
purpose of promoting or facilitating [the commission of the offense]." 2 19 Had one of Dr. Stern's patients died, the theory of foreseeability could have made Anderson guilty of manslaughter.2 20
This result, quite possible under conspiracy analysis, would not be
supportable if analyzed strictly in terms of accomplice liability,
which would require proof that Mrs. Anderson aided, abetted, asthe requisisted, and encouraged the crime of manslaughter with
221
site mens rea (at a minimum, criminal negligence).
Even where a conspiracy involves complex objectives and requires the participation of many members assuming various roles,
levels of activity, and degrees of responsibility, the court has found
every defendant-smugglers, middle men, retail sellers operating
at different geographical locations-members of one single conspiratorial scheme,2 22 on the theory that their activities are interdependent. Thus it becomes possible to attribute the illegal acts of any
conspirator to every other conspirator. Should the participants engage in other criminal activities, the proliferation of liability would
be limited by the requirement of common objective that is, a purpose shared by the co-conspirators.2 23
219.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 5.03(1) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).

220. See also Regina v. Creamer, [1965] 3 All. E.R. 2 (Crim. App.). In that case
Creamer arranged for an abortion to be performed and was found guilty of manslaughter
along with the abortionist when the victim died. Although accomplices who perform the
function of aiding and abetting a crime can be found guilty to the same degree as the perpetrator, there is good reason to differentiate. In Parkerv. Commonwealth, where the evidence
showed that Parker, with malice aforethought, incited Shepard to kill in the heat of passion,
Parker was found guilty of murder and Shepard of manslaughter. 180 Ky. 102, 201 S.W.475
(1918). However, Richards' conviction of felony attack, on evidence that she had arranged
for two accomplices to attack her husband, was reversed where the accomplices who committed the physical act had been found guilty of a misdemeanor. The court reasoned that
only one offense had been committed and that Richards could not be convicted of any offense more serious than the one committed by the accomplices. Regina v. Richards, [1973] 3
W.L.R. 888 (C.A.).
221. A conviction of first degree murder on a felony murder theory is an exception to
this principle. See Part IV infra.
222. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). This is the chain theory of conspiracy, where the links of the chain are joined by a common purpose. See also Blumenthal v.
United States, 832 U.S. 539 (1947); Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942). The
"wheel" theory of conspiracy, where a central figure acts as a "hub" conspiring with defendants who are the "spokes," requires a connection among the conspirators, a "rim," to form
the individual conspiracies into one single conspiracy. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750 (1946).
223. Traditionally, the court will not find a single conspiracy where activities are di-
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The Model Penal Code has warned that "[the] law would lose
all sense of just proportion 224 if a member of a conspiracy could
be "held accountable for thousands of offenses that he did not influence at all."225 It is for this reason that a common objective has
been required. The requirement has checked, to a degree, the erosion of the traditional ideal of personal, individual guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
An example of the undefined and far-reaching liability against
which the Model Penal Code warned is found in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 226 RICO makes it
"unlawful for any person . . . associated with any enterprise engaged in. . . interstate. . . commerce to. . . participate, directly

or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity ....

227

RICO's definition of

"racketeering activity" includes twenty-four federal crimes and
eight state crimes. 228 The commission of two of these offenses

within ten years satisfies the pattern requirement. 2 " The establishment of a connection between a pattern of racketeering activities
and an interstate "enterprise," defined as a personal or business
association, can result in a violation of RICO. 30 Conspiracy to violate the statute is a separate offense.2 31
Cases interpreting RICO are not in agreement as to what conduct constitutes a violation of the statute. United States v. Elliott 2 2 held that "to conduct or participate in the affairs of an en-

terprise through a pattern of racketeering activity"23 3 required the
verse unless they are performed to achieve a single goal. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d
880, 901 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Delph v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). Had
Walter Pinkerton and Dr. Stern diversified their activities to include the distribution of
dangerous drugs and entered into additional agreements to carry out their objective, the
liability of Daniel Pinkerton and Anderson would be limited to conspiracies in which they
were engaged.
224. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
225. Id.
226. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976) enacted as part of Title IX. of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970.
227. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
228. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
230. 18 U.S.C. §8 1961(4), 1962(a) (1976).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976).
232. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Delph v. United States, 439 U.S.
953 (1978). See also United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 271 n.16 (6th Cir. 1979).
233. 571 F.2d at 902.
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commission of two or more unrelated "predicate crimes. ' s" United
States v. Stofsky 235 required that the two crimes be related in order to establish a pattern of racketeering activities. Whether the
concept of "enterprise" reaches only legitimate business or all enterprises, legal and illegal, remains an open question.23 6
RICO allows convictions not possible under traditional conspiracy doctrine. If the evidence shows that one defendant solicited
prostitution and committed auto theft, and another defendant sold
heroin and attempted to bribe a juror in his murder trial, and
there is also a connection between the two defendants, however
tenuous, they may be deemed participants in some informal de
facto association. 27 Each may find himself ultimately liable for
any number of unrelated crimes that were neither known, foreseen
nor contemplated on the ground that the "thread tying.

. .

these

' 238
individuals together was.. . the desire to make money.
In Elliott, the court applauded RICO for its displacement of
"many of the legal precepts traditionally applied to concerted

criminal activity .

.

. [and for freeing] the government from the

strictures of the. . . conspiracy doctrine 23 9 which would have required a showing of a single common objective before individuals
engaged in different activities could be linked as conspirators. In
affirming the convictions of four defendants where there was no
demonstration of contact between them, the Court of Appeals acknowledged "doubt that a single conspiracy could be demonstrated. .

.

. The activities

. . .

are simply too diverse to be tied

together on the theory that participation
in one activity necessarily
240
implied awareness of others.
234. Id.
235. 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
236. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Aleman, 609
F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976). United States
v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), interpreted the enterprise requirement as requiring
legitimate business, thus reading RICO as proscribing their infiltration through a pattern of
racketeer activities. Any other interpretation, said the court, would be redundant because it
"transforms the statute into a simple proscription against 'patterns of racketeering activity'" and results in a "purposeless circumlocution." Every "'pattern of racketeering activity' becomes an 'enterprise' whose affairs are conducted through the pattern of racketeering
activity." Id. at 265-66. See United States v. Turkette, 101 S.Ct. 2524 (1981); United States

v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1980).
237. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 898.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 900.
240. Id. at 902.
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The court then praised the statute's "legislative innovation in
the realm of individual liability for group crime," 24 1 and found that
'24 2
it did not offend "the rule that guilt be individual and personal.
The court rationalized its approval of the statute's departure from
traditional conspiracy law by noting that "[w]e punish conspiracy
as a distinct offense because we recognize that collective action toward an illegal end involves a greater risk to society than individ243
ual action toward the same end.
This "greater risk" should not, however, mean that the government, in its proof of conspiracy, need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each alleged conspirator engaged in conduct
that could justifiably result in conviction and the imposition of
punishment. Assuming that it is the intentional agreement to commit a criminal offense that is the gravamen of the crime of conspiracy, then the accused has the right to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that he personally entered into an agreement with the purpose of engaging in the commission of a particular crime.24
Circumstantial evidence must of course, be permissible; the
agreement may be demonstrated from evidence of the act or acts.
A court which is presented with a strong case of circumstantial evidence must be free to "reject as beyond the range of probability
'245
that [the chain of events] was the result of mere chance.
241. Id. at 903.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 905. The justification for conspiracy theory stems from deep seated anxiety
about the threat posed by collective action. "[C]ollective criminal agreement-partnership
in crime-presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their
path of criminality. Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes
possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which
it has embarked. Combination in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the group was formed. In sum, the danger which a
conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim
of the enterprise." Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.).
244. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1)(a) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
245. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 223 (1939). This case involved
far-reaching changes in the defendants' business practices which could not be explained
absent an agreement between them.
Although proof of a widespread effect on prices can support an inference that the defendants intended their actions to have that result, an instruction that the jury could rely
"on a legal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices" is error.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978).
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Nevertheless, a presumption of conspiratorial agreement from
evidence of an act should not be allowed unless the government
can establish the appropriate connection between the act and the
agreement. 48 Once the agreement has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the government, the criminal objectives advanced
by the agreement should not be attributed to all the participants
without a sufficient showing of individual complicity. Where one
conspirator has engaged in conduct that constitutes the underlying
crime, liability should be imposed on the accomplice only "if he
acts with the kind of culpability. . that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. ' 247 Thus, Daniel Pinkerton should have
been held responsible only for the crimes which he agreed to commit, and Mrs. Anderson should have been insulated from liability
for crimes in which she played no active or consensual part.
IV.

Felony-Murder

The felony-murder rule imposes liability without a finding of
malice. A finding by the jury that a death occurred during the
commission of a felony results in the conclusion that it was the
accused's intention to cause that death and the conviction will be
for murder.
Murder is traditionally defined as the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought. 24 S The prosecution must
prove that the accused harbored the intent to kill or that he committed the act under circumstances showing "an abandoned and
malignant heart." 2' 9 First degree murder requires a killing accomplished "by means of a bomb, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by
any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or
which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem," etc.2 50 Killings that
occur during the commission of other dangerous felonies are classi246. The rational connection test, discussed in notes 78-102 and accompanying text
supra is inadequate to establish this connection. It would permit a finding of guilt of conspiracy from evidence of an act that is in itself not criminal.
247. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
248. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970); see also S.C. CODE § 16-3-10 (1976);

§ 39-2401 (1975).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1970).
250. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970); see also 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2502
(Purdon 1973); N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a (1974); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03

TENN. CODE ANN.

249.

(Vernon 1974).
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fled as second degree murder.2 51
Although the deaths occurring during the commission of a felony are often accidental, unintended killings which ordinarily
would be classified as involuntary manslaughter,252 the common
law felony-murder rule, which survives in many American jurisdictions, 53 classifies them as murder. Thus the prosecution is relieved
of the burden of proving that the accused intended to kill. The
presumption that the defendant is innocent of the intent to kill is
destroyed. Intent is simply imputed: proof of the felony will suffice
for proof of malice or in the case of the felonies enumerated by
statutes, for proof of willfulness, deliberation and premeditation.
Traditional strictures of criminal law will not tolerate the substitution of the intent to commit one crime for the intent to commit another. 25 4 This, however, is precisely the result of felony murder. In State v. Thorne,255 for example, defendant Thorne had
entered a store with the intention of committing an armed robbery
and had killed the storekeeper when his gun accidentally discharged. The court held that the facts supported a first-degree felony-murder conviction.2 6
Similarly, if a robber, accompanied by a number of accomplices, pulls the trigger that kills a victim, the felony-murder rule
will allow that conduct to be attributed to every other actor on the
theory that all of them acted "in concert. . . or infurtherance of a
common object or purpose,' 2' 5 despite the widely different roles

each may have played and the different intentions each may have
had. Once that step has been accomplished, the intent to murder
251.
252.

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970); N.H. REV.

STAT.

ANN.,

§ 630:1-b (1974).

Manslaughter is the unlawful killing, without malice, of a human being. Involun-

tary manslaughter occurs in the commission of an unlawful act which does not amount to a
felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, or without due caution and circumspection. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West
1970). See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (Purdon 1973); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 19.05 (Vernon 1974).
253. Hawaii and Kentucky have abolished the felony-murder rule by statute. 7A HAWAI REV. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 701-07 (1980); Ky. REv. STAT. § 507.020 (1980 Supp.). Michigan
recently abolished it by case law. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
254. See, e.g., Regina v. Cunningham, [1957] 41 Crim. App. 155 (Crim. App.), where
the court reversed a conviction for asphyxiation where the criminal intent proved was intent
to steal. See also Regina v. Faulkner, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 550 (C.C.R. 1877), where an arson
conviction was reversed because the mens rea proved was intent to steal.
255. 39 Utah 208, 117 P. 58 (1911).
256. Id.
257. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541, 544 (1863).
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is, in reality, simply assumed.
The felony-murder rule has been justified on the ground that
it is designed to protect against the accidental but foreseeable
deaths that experience teaches us will occur when an individual or
group of individuals set out to rob, rape, or burglarize. It is a rule
dependent upon the rationale that a death occurring during a felony is the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's
conduct.15 The phrase is almost identical to the presumption that
the Court in Sandstrom v. Montana"9 found offensive to due process concepts because it relieved the prosecutor of the burden of
proving an essential element of the crime charged-the element of
intent. The felony-murder rule would apparently allow an instruction even more offensive to constitutional principles: the law
presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his accomplices' voluntary acts.
During the period of its extensive proliferation, the felonymurder rule, following a causation theory, permitted convictions
where the victim of a robbery killed the defendant's accomplice,2 60
a policeman killed a bystander,2 6 1 an accomplice killed himself
while attempting arson,2 62 the victim of an armed robbery died of a
heart attack,2 63 a fireman died fighting a fire set by an arsonist,2 "

the victim died of an overdose of heroin bought from the defendant.26" Each of these deaths could be traced to the commission of
the felony and the courts did not choose to view the intervening
events as independent acts or occurrences breaking the chain of
causation.
Most jurisdictions have limited the felony-murder rule to dangerous felonies, 266 and have applied the doctrine only to those killings committed by the physical act of one of the felons. The California Supreme Court in People v. Washington,2 6 7 reasoned that
258.

Regina v. Horsey, 176 Eng. Rep. 129 (Assizes 1862).

259.

442 U.S. 510 (1979).

260.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 282 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).

261. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
262. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955); cf. People v. Ferlin,
203 Cal. 587, 265 P. 230 (1928).
263. People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1969).
264. State v. Glover, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932).
265. But see State v. Mauldin, 215 Kan. 956, 529 P.2d 124 (1974).
266. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966).
267. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
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"[w]hen a killing is not committed by a robber or by his accomplice but by his victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to
the robber, for the killing is not committed by him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery. '2 8 Nor did the Washington
court find it sufficient that the killing was foreseeable and could be
viewed as the proximate result of the felony. 269 A defendant who
initiates a gun battle can, of course, be found guilty of murder, and
Washington does not bar conviction of accomplices who did not
themselves perform the act that resulted in the death. The limitation fails to address the problems created by imposition of vicarious liability. The accused can still be found guilty of murder if the
prosecutor proves that the accomplice "with a conscious disregard
for life, intentionally commits an act that is likely to cause death,
and his victim or a police officer kills in reasonable response to
such act.

'2 70

Thus, where one robber points a gun at a victim and

the latter draws her gun, fires and kills a bystander, criminal liability for the murder will extend to the driver of the getaway car,
sitting outside in the sunlight. He can be found guilty of murder
and even face death 271 even though he had no intention of participating in the crime of murder. Attributing the act and the mental
state of the first robber to the accomplice in such situations not
only assumes the existence of an agreement between them, but
makes no allowance for the possibility that the killing may have
exceeded the scope of the plan. Moreover, it utterly fails to take
into consideration the actual state of mind of the accomplice. The
requirement that the death be foreseeable does not solve the problem. At most, the driver is guilty of recklessly failing to foresee
268.

Id. at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.

269. Id.
270. People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 704, 408 P.2d 365, 373-74, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909,
917-18 (1965).
271. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), Lockett was sentenced to death on evidence that she waited in a car with the motor running while her accomplice, Parker, was
committing a pawnshop robbery. Lockett was convicted of the aggravated murder of the
victim who was killed when Parker's gun discharged. Parker avoided the death penalty by
testifying for the state but Lockett rejected plea bargaining. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the judgment imposing the death penalty on the ground that the Ohio statute did not provide for "consideration of relevant mitigating factors." Id. at 608. Justice
White concurred in the judgment on the ground that imposing the death sentence on "those
who had no intent to bring about the death of the victim is not only grossly out of propor-

tion to the severity of the crime but also fails to contribute significantly to acceptable...
goals of punishment" and, thus, constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at

626.
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that armed robbery can result in death, and he should not be convicted of any crime more serious than manslaughter.
California has devised an ingenious limitation on the doctrine
of vicarious liability for co-felons. In People v. Antick, 272 a police
officer, responding to a robbery suspect's gunfire, killed him. Since
the deceased's malicious conduct did not result in the death of another human being but rather in his own death, the court did not
find the deceased's accomplice, Antick, guilty of murder. The court
reasoned that Antick could not be held vicariously liable for a
crime which his accomplice, Bose, could not have committed.7
Moreover, the killing had occurred several hours after the robbery,
some miles from the scene, and Antick had not been present.
Not only had Antick not committed the act, he lacked the
mens rea of murder. But the court did not reverse his conviction
for those reasons. Given the reasoning in\Antick, the limitation is
illusory.
If, for example, Antick had been on the scene and Bose's act,
committed in "willful, wanton, disregard" had drawn the police officer's gunfire and resulted in Antick's death, Bose could have been
found guilty of murder. The reasoning would also allow an accomplice, awaiting the profits of the crime at home, to be found guilty
of first-degree murder of Antick. If Antick had been wounded but,
did not die, neither Bose nor the absent accomplice could have
been found guilty of attempted murder under the traditional
the74
ory that they did not possess the requisite specific intent.
The Model Penal Code has proposed a solution to the felonymurder rule which would allow a presumption of recklessness
where a homicide occurs when the actor or an accomplice is engaged in the attempt, commission or subsequent flight from certain
felonies. 7 5
Aside from the obvious burden-shifting objections, the solution does not go far enough. Felony-murder is a rule that should be
abolished. Not only does it suffer from the constitutional disabilities this article has examined, it does not appear to be of significant benefit to the prosecution.
272. 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
273. Id. at 89, 539 P.2d at 49, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
274. But see People v. Kessler, 57 III. 2d 493, 315 N.E.2d 29 (1974).
275. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
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For a conviction of murder where a homicide occurs during
the commission of a felony, the prosecutor must prove the underlying felony-that is robbery, or burglary, for example. If he can do
that, it is very likely that he can prove malice on the part of the
felon who directly caused the death. Furthermore, if the evidence
shows that the accomplice participated in the killing, he too can be
found guilty of murder. Unless there is some additional showing,
the conviction of both defendants will be for murder in the second
degree.
Where the state of mind of the accused is more appropriately
described as criminal recklessness, the conviction will not be for
murder but for involuntary manslaughter. If the accomplice is
merely present, he should not be found guilty of any degree of
homicide unless he played a role in its commission, that is, unless
he acted with the requisite mens rea.
A finding of first-degree murder for both defendants does not
rationally follow where proof of the crime committed is not firstdegree murder. It is only the predilection of the felony-murder rule
to "expand itself to the limits of its logic, 2 7'6 with statutory assistance,2 7 that a result so illogical and so unjust can occur.

Conclusion
The presumption of innocence, prized as an example of the
moral superiority of our system of justice, is undermined by procedural devices and substantive definitions that relieve the prosecutor of the traditional burden of proof by the reasonable doubt
standard. The use of presumptions and affirmative defenses shifts
the burden of proof to the defendant to prove the non-existence of
some element of the crime charged. The literal application of conspiracy and felony-murder principles results in the additional advantage to the prosecutor of imposing vicarious liability on accomplices upon proof of criminal acts committed by partners in crime.
However expedient it may appear to "ease the prosecutor's path to
276. B. CARDoZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921).
277. In People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1965), the
defendants were found guilty of murder on a vicarious liability theory rather than the felony-murder rule. The court then elevated the murder to first degree because robbery is one
of the felonies enumerated by California's felony-murder rule. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189
(West 1970).
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conviction," the ultimate consequence is to cast doubt on the verdicts rendered in our criminal courts and thus to undermine our
confidence in the belief that it is only the guilty who shall be
condemned.

